Abstract XML access control policies involving updates may contain security flaws, here called inconsistencies, in which a forbidden operation may be simulated by performing a sequence of allowed operations. This article investigates the problem of deciding whether a policy is consistent, and if not, how its inconsistencies can be repaired. We consider total and partial policies expressed in terms of annotated schemas defining which operations are allowed or denied for the XML trees that are instances of the schema. We show that consistency is decidable in ptime for such policies and that consistent partial policies can be extended to unique least-privilege consistent total policies. We also consider repair problems based on deleting privileges to restore consistency, show that finding minimal repairs is np-complete, and give heuristics for finding repairs. Finally, we experimentally evaluate these algorithms in comparison with an exact approach based on answer-set programming.
publicly accessible and other information that should be kept confidential. XML database security is becoming an important problem because of the increasing use of XML databases to store and manage such data. There are over 50 XQuery implementations, including a number of commercial native XML database products as well as extensions of relational databases with XML or XQuery features. However, security and specifically fine-grained access control have not yet been adopted widely in these products. Most of them, in contrast, support a coarse-grained model wherein users are granted or denied access to a whole document (XML tree).
This coarse-grained model has the same drawbacks as similar models for relational databases:
-Security policies may be implemented by the middleware or client, by code spread across many modules. This makes it difficult to understand, validate, or change the security policy, which in turn opens the door to bugs or vulnerabilities. -Individual database users may have unnecessary capabilities to perform actions. Thus, they can accidentally or maliciously damage the integrity of the data. If any user's account is subverted, an attacker immediately gains a great deal of power over the system.
Fine-grained access control policies that are enforced by the database itself mitigate these problems, by providing a high-level, declarative description of the policy that makes it possible to assign users only necessary capabilities. Thus, a number of approaches to specifying and enforcing fine-grained access control policies for XML data (or for XML views of databases) have been developed. The main techniques explored to date include security views or filtering, which hide confidential data [11, 18, 21, 29] ; accessibility maps that annotate the XML data indicating which parts may be read by different users [16, 32] ; or static analysis techniques that attempt to statically determine whether a requested part of the database may be read [24] .
These techniques mainly address confidentiality-the problem of keeping sensitive information secret. This is only one part of security. Another important aspect of security is integrity-the problem of ensuring that sensitive data cannot be changed or corrupted accidentally or by attackers. Both confidentiality and integrity can be addressed by access control policies that check read and write operations. For XML databases, most work so far only addresses read-access policies, but there is a growing literature on XML write-access control techniques that constrain updates [13, 15, 17, 20, 23] .
In this article, we study an important issue for write-access control policies for XML data: the problem of consistency. In general, an XML write-access control policy consists of a set of rules that specify the update actions a user can perform based on the syntax of the update and not its actual behavior. Thus, it is possible that a single update request that is explicitly forbidden by the policy can nevertheless be simulated by a sequence of allowed update requests. We call such write-access control policies inconsistent.
For highly expressive classes of policies whose rules can be defined by arbitrary XPath expressions, consistency becomes undecidable [13] , indeed, in this case it is closely related to reachability problems that are also undecidable, as shown by Moore [23] and (for reachability modulo a schema) by Jacquemard and Rusinowitch [15] . Such policies and rules can describe when an XML document (i.e., a tree) corresponds to a Turing machine state and can constrain updates so that only valid transitions can be performed. If policies can also contain negative rules asserting that the machine cannot make a transition from a start state to an accept state, then a policy is consistent if and only if the corresponding Turing machine cannot halt.
To avoid this undecidability, we must consider weaker classes of policies or smaller classes of updates. In this article, we develop an approach in which policies and allowable updates are both constrained by a schema. That is, there must be a DTD-like schema constraining all XML documents under access control; the policies are defined in terms of this schema (rather than as arbitrary XPath expressions), and only update operations that are guaranteed to preserve the schema are permitted. Although these restrictions may appear draconian, in this article we provide examples which show that some common schemas and policies can fit this model. Moreover, there is a substantial payoff in doing so, in terms of complexity: consistency checking becomes a syntactic, PTIME check of the policy, rather than undecidable.
The first contribution of the article is a nontrivial and useful class of security policies for which consistency checking is in PTIME. To our knowledge, this is the first example of such a class for XML write-access control policies. In this context, we study both total and partial policies. For the former, each possible privilege is explicitly allowed or denied, whereas for the latter, some privileges can be inferred from others. Partial policies are a less verbose way to express access control information, but this conciseness only introduces a polynomialtime increase in the complexity of consistency checking.
Simply reporting that a policy is inconsistent may not be helpful to users, especially if policies can grow large so that the ramifications of small changes are hard to predict. Thus, a natural question is how to suggest repairs or updates to policies that restore consistency. There are a number of interesting possible choices for classes of repairs; we focus on what we call least-privilege repairs that can only remove privileges, in line with the principle of least privilege [27] . That is, repairs may remove privileges that lead to inconsistencies, but cannot introduce new privileges.
Thus, the second main contribution of the article is a study of the repair problem. We show that computing minimal repairs is in general NP-complete. Moreover, we develop and experimentally evaluate practical repair algorithms, including a naive greedy algorithm and a more sophisticated algorithm based on encoding repair problems as instances of the Minimum Set Cover Problem (MSCP) [9] . Our experiments show that both naive and MSCP-based repair algorithms find small repairs in practice, and do so considerably faster compared to a generic, exact approach based on the DLV answer-set programming system [19] . Moreover, as policy and schema size grow, our algorithms remain fast enough for semi-interactive use: for example, our approach runs in seconds to repair a policy over a schema with 500 elements, whereas DLV does not finish within a minute for the same problem.
Example
To give a flavor of the approach to policies, consistency and repairs taken in the rest of the article, we consider a small example: a typical hospital information system where patient data are stored in a database and accessed by client-side or middleware code that authenticates users and then mediates queries and updates to the data on their behalf. In the rest of the example, we write "the user updates the data" as shorthand for "the client or middleware updates the data on behalf of an authenticated user." The raw data could be stored either in a traditional RDBMS or native XML database, but the system provides an XML view according to a schema and clients can update the data through this view. Moreover, different users and user roles may have different XML security views associated with them [11] , ensuring that users can only see data that they need for their work. However, we may want to grant only read-access to some of the visible data.
The XML DTD in Fig. 1 describes patient data. A patient has a name and is associated with zero or more treatments. A treatment consists of a drug that was prescribed to the patient and that can be one of placebo, presDrug (prescription) and OTC (over-the-counter) drug, a diagnosis and the date of a patient's visit. The XML document shown in Fig. 2 is an instance of the hospital DTD shown in Fig. 1 . The document can be updated and queried by different users, for example, doctors, nurses, administrators. The policy shown in Table 1 shows a policy describing the actions that nurses are allowed (+) and not allowed (−) to perform. We use a variant of the policy language XAcU [13] to provide fine-grained write-access control over the hospital data, enforced by the database, to complement any security checks performed by the client or middleware. In this naive policy, we allow a nurse to perform insert, delete, and replace update actions. More specifically, a nurse is allowed to insert and delete patients (rules +(hospital, insert (patient))) and +(hospital, delete (patient))), but she cannot modify a patient's diagnosis or change a prescription drug to an off-the-counter drug (rule -(drug,replace (*,*))). Note that here (drug,replace (*,*)) is used as a shorthand for all possible replacements of one drug with another. However, it is easy to see that the diagnosis of a patient can still be changed by deleting a patient record and then inserting it back again with a modified value of diagnosis. Thus, a forbidden update request can be achieved by a sequence of allowed ones.
We call an access control policy with this characteristic inconsistent. Given an inconsistent policy, it is a natural question to ask how the policy can be repaired to restore consistency. Obviously, any inconsistent policy can be repaired by removing all of its positive or negative rules (or simply all of its rules). However, we expect security administrators may prefer to select among smaller repairs, and select among them based on domain knowledge. For example, the above policy may be repaired by taking away either rule +(hospital, insert (patient)) or +(hospital, delete (patient)). It seems sensible to allow nurses to insert patient records and change some information such as names, while forbidding nurses to delete patient records. Instead, a record deletion should be done by an administrator, and a change to the treatment information should be done by a doctor.
In addition to consistency, an important property that should be considered when defining a policy language is succinctness. We identify here two forms of succinctness: syntactic and semantic. In the first case, we can define macros that can be expanded (e.g., this is the case for rule -(drug, replace (*,*)) ) to all matching privileges. This kind of syntactic shorthand can be simulated by performing a sequence of actions justified by other privileges. For the second case, we believe it is useful to allow policies to be partial, that is, to omit privileges that are implied by others. For example, in the original policy above, it is redundant to state that nurses can replace patient names, since they can already just delete the patient record and replace it with a new record with an updated name. In a partial policy, we may omit this rule.
Outline
As described above, this article makes the following contributions:
1. We define consistency and identify a useful class of security policies for which consistency checking is in PTIME; we extend these results to partial policies, from which total policies can be recovered in PTIME. 2. We study the problem of repairing consistent policies by removing privileges and show that it is NP-complete; we give exact and approximation algorithms for finding repairs.
3. We present an implemented tool for policy consistency checking and repair called ACCon, and we experimentally evaluate the consistency and repair algorithms.
Preliminary versions of this work have appeared previously in a conference paper [5] and a demonstration of ACCon [6] . This article incorporates revised and extended material from those papers. Specifically, compared to [5] , this article includes full proofs and extends the schema language from the relatively restricted case of structured DTDs [11] to a larger class of XML Schemas. We consider Extended DTDs (EDTDs) [22] and Chain EDTDs (CEDTDs) based on chain regular expressions [3] . While CEDTDs are not as expressive as full XML Schemas, many schemas encountered in practice only use chain regular expressions. Compared to [6] , we present a more mature tool and a systematic experimental evaluation, including comparison with an encoding of the repair problem using answer-set programming in DLV.
The structure of the rest of the article is as follows. In Sect. 2, we review background concerning XML trees and DTDs. In Sect. 3, we introduce our version of the XML Access Control for Updates (XAcU) policy formalism [13] . In Sect. 4, we define consistency and give polynomial-time algorithms for checking consistency of total and partial policies. In Sect. 5, we define the policy repair problem, prove its NP-completeness, and give algorithms for repairing policies. In Sect. 6, we present an experimental evaluation based on the ACCon implementation. Section 7 discusses additional related work, and Sect. 8 concludes.
Note to practitioners: From the point of view of implementation, the key sections of this article are Sect. 3 (defining security policies), Sects. 4.1, and 4.3 giving definitions and algorithms for consistency. Section 4.2 gives details of the proof of the main theoretical result and can be skipped by readers only interested in implementation. The repair algorithms in Sect. 5 and their experimental evaluation in Sect. 6 can also be appreciated without reading the accompanying proofs.
Background

Trees
We model XML documents as rooted unordered trees with labels from L∪{str}, where L is the infinite domain of labels.
Definition 1 (XML Tree) An unordered XML tree t is a structure of the form t = (N t , E t , λ t , r t , v t ) where:
is a tree in the usual sense with root r t : N t is the set of nodes, E t ⊂ N t × N t is the set of edges, and there is exactly one path from r t to each node of N t , 2. λ t : N t → L ∪ {str} is a labeling function over nodes, such that λ(n) = str implies n is a leaf, and 3. v t is a function that assigns string values to leaves labeled with str.
We denote by children t (n), parent t (n), and desc t (n), the children, parent, and descendant nodes, respectively, of a node n in an XML tree t. We write desc * t (n) for desc t (n) ∪ {n}. The set desc e t (n) denotes the edges in E t between descendant nodes of n.
Trees have the standard notion of isomorphism; two isomorphic trees have the same structure, even if they differ in the choice of vertex names used.
Definition 2 (XML Tree Isomorphism)
We say that an XML tree t 1 is isomorphic to an XML tree t 2 , denoted t 1 ≡ t 2 , iff there exists a bijection h : N t 1 → N t 2 where:
Atomic updates
Our updates are modeled according to the XQuery Update Facility 1.0 Recommendation [26] . The syntax of atomic updates is as follows:
A delete(n) operation will delete node n and all its descendants. A replace(n, t) operation will replace the subtree with root n by the tree t. A replaceVal(n, s) operation will replace the text value of node n with string s. An insert(n, t) operation will insert a tree t as a child node below n. In the standard, there are several additional types of insert operations, allowing to insert nodes before, after, or into the content of other nodes, but since we consider unordered XML trees these distinctions are unnecessary. More formally, for a tree
, and a string value s, the result of applying insert(n, t 2 ), replace(n, t 2 ), delete(n), and replace(n, s) to t 1 is a new tree t defined formally as shown in Table 2 . We denote by [[op] ](t) the result of applying update operation op on tree t.
Consider for instance the atomic operations insert(n 1 , t 1 ) and delete(n 2 ) where n 1 is the hospital node and n 2 is the last, in document order, treatment node of the XML document shown in Fig. 2 . The inserted subtree t 1 and the deleted subtree t 2 are shown in Fig. 4 . The result of applying these atomic operations on the XML document of Fig. 2 is the updated XML document shown in Fig. 3 . 
Schemas
There are two main schema languages for XML: Document Type Definition (DTD) and XML schema (XSD). Since we want to deal with both types of schemas, we need a common abstraction for both. In [22] , it is shown that Extended DTDs (EDTDs) can be used as such an abstraction. For the purposes of this article, we use the generic term schema to refer to an arbitrary Extended DTD. In this article, we consider nonrecursive schemas only. 
where ",", "+" and " * " stand for concatenation, disjunction, and Kleene star, respectively, for the EMPTY element content, str for text values and B ∈ Types.
We will refer to A → Rg(A) as the production rule for A. 1. r t is labeled with the name associated with type A (i.e., η(r t ) = A), 2. if η(n) ∈ Types then the label associated with η(n) is the label of n(μ(η(n)) = λ t (n)) and the labels of the children of n match the regular expression associated
, and 3. if η(n) = str then λ t (n) = str and v t (n) is defined and children t (n) is empty. Note that even though we are not including regular expressions of the form r ? and r + which are common in DTDs, we can express them using (r + ) and (r, r * ), respectively. In XSDs, it is possible to express cardinality restrictions using minOccurs and maxOccurs which are not expressible using EDTD. However, for the purposes of this article, we treat elements with cardinality restrictions the same as Kleene star; the more specific information about cardinality is not relevant to our access control policies. Anonymous types in XSDs can be easily handled by EDTD by adding a type with a fresh name.
The distinction in EDTDs between element names and types is needed only to represent XSDs. In the case of DTDs, there is only one type associated for each name, that is, Ele = Types and μ is the identity. Thus, a DTD can be expressed simply by (Ele, Rg, rt) .
In this article, we will restrict attention to EDTDs that are unambiguous in the sense that for every tree t ∈ I D there is exactly one mapping η showing how t validates in D. This property is important because we will use type names in security policies, and ambiguity complicates the meaning of such policies significantly. Both ordinary DTDs and XML Schemas are constrained to be unambiguous, and Martens et al. [22] investigate several other classes of EDTDs that are unambiguous, including single-type and 1-pass preorder typing. They argue that these restrictions are more liberal than the ones employed in the DTD or XML Schema standards. In any case, we consider unambiguous EDTDs, leaving the question of how this requirement is enforced as a separate issue that is already largely addressed by prior work.
Structured regular expressions and SEDTDs
In [11] and a number of other papers, the authors study a special type of DTDs that they call structured DTDs. Although not all DTDs are syntactically representable in this form, one can (as argued in [11] ) represent general DTDs by introducing new element types.
Here, we would like to do the same for EDTD. This simplification will allow us to analyze the problems of access control in a simpler setting and then generalize. The relationship between the element types of a SEDTD can be represented using a directed graph that we call a SEDTD graph. 
Chain regular expressions and CEDTDs
Besides structured schemas, we consider schemas whose regular expressions belong to a restricted class called chain regular expressions (or CHAREs). These were introduced in work on inferring DTDs or schemas from example data, where it was argued that over 90% of regular expressions encountered in practical schemas are chain regular expressions [3] . Essentially, a chain RE is a sequence of factors, each of which is of the form ( 
That is, a CHARE is either an atomic type str or a sequence of sum factors (A 1 + · · · + A n ), or starred single elements. Moreover, we require that types be single-occurrence: no type name is reused. Note that a sum factor may have just one alternative; thus, A, (B + C), D * , E, F * , (G + H ) is a CHARE according to our definition. Note also that repeated element names within a sum term are redundant. Other regular expression operators such as A? (optional A) and A+ (sequence of one or more As) could also be included. For the purposes of access control, they can be handled the same as Kleene star A * , by allowing only insertion and deletion operations; the additional cardinality constraint on the number of As is irrelevant to access control.
We restrict attention to regular expressions that use each type name at most once. (This follows from the fact that we consider unambiguous DTDs over unordered XML.) We say that a chain EDTD or CEDTD is an EDTD in which every regular expression used in a rule is a CHARE. Every SEDTD is a CEDTD, so in the sequel results proved for CEDTDs will automatically apply to SEDTDs as well.
Example 2 (Relating XSDs and CEDTDs)
In this article, we use SEDTDs and CEDTDs, which include features absent from DTDs; on the other hand, XML Schemas include many features that are not supported by CEDTDs. Nevertheless, we can easily check whether a general XML Schema defines a CEDTD, and many schemas do fit this restriction. For example, the XSD in Fig. 6 Note that elements of type caAddress and usAddress are associated with the element name address.
XML access control framework
Policies
We use the notion of update access type to specify the access authorizations in our context. Our update access types are inspired by the XAcU annot language discussed in [13] . That work followed the idea of security annotations introduced in [11] to specify the access authorizations for XML documents in the presence of a DTD. 
Definition 7 (Update Access Types) Given a SEDTD D, an update type (UT) is an expression of the form:
Here, η is the unique mapping from each node in t to the element type associated with it (uniqueness follows from the assumption that D is unambiguous).
It is trivial to translate our update access types to the security annotations used in XAcU annot . In this work, we require that the evaluation of an update operation on a tree that conforms to a schema D results in a tree that conforms to D. It is clear then that each update access type is not meaningful because allowing the deletion of a C-element would result in an XML document that does not conform to the DTD, and therefore the update will be rejected. Similarly, (R, delete(A)) or (R, insert(A)) are invalid since there has to be exactly one node (labeled A, B, J or K ) under R. On the other hand, (B, delete(E)) and (B, insert(E)) are appropriate for this specific DTD. Finally, we exclude reflexive replacement update access types (A, replace(B i , B i )) from consideration. These would be schema-preserving when the content of A matches either B * i or B 1 +· · ·+ B n , but they do not actually provide any expressive power that cannot be simulated by other UATs. Moreover, as discussed further in Section 4, reflexive replacement UATs are undesirable from the point of view of consistency analysis.
The relation uat valid_in D, which indicates that an update access type uat is valid for the DTD D, is defined as follows:
We define the set of valid UATs for a given CEDTD D as valid(D) = {uat | uat valid_in D}. We define a valid run as a sequence t 0 
. , n}, we have t i = op (t i−1 ).
A security policy will be defined by a set of allowed and forbidden valid UATs.
Definition 8 A security policy P defined over a CEDTD D is represented by (A, F)
where A is the set of allowed and F the set of forbidden update access types defined over 
and F = valid(D) \ A. This is a total policy. On the other hand, P = (A, ∅) is a partial policy.
The set of operations that are allowed by a policy P = (A, F) on an XML tree t, denoted by [ We say that a valid run t 0
Analogously, the forbidden operations are [[F]](t) = {op | op matches t uat and uat ∈ F}. If a policy P is total, its semantics is given by its allowed updates, that is,
The meaning of partial policies is studied in detail in Sect. 4.3.
Note that we do not allow replacements or deletes that target the root of the tree. Indeed, replacing or deleting the root of an XML tree does not make sense because the resulting (empty) tree will not match the DTD. Replacements and deletes targeting the root are examples of updates that are not covered by any UAT; thus, they cannot be allowed or forbidden by a policy. Instead, if we want a user to be able to do anything to the tree we can allow this using a policy (valid(D), ∅) that allows all of the valid UATs. (It is easy to see that this suffices to allow any tree to be updated to any other tree.)
Consistency
Total policies
A policy is said to be consistent if it is not possible to simulate a forbidden update through a sequence of allowed updates. More formally: 
Consistency is highly sensitive to the design of policies and update types. For example, we have consciously chosen to omit reflexive replace update types of the form (A, replace(B i , B i )) for an element type in the schema with production rule of the form B * or B 1 + · · · + B n . To see why, consider a conference management system where a paper element has a decision and a title subelement. Suppose that the policy allows the author of the paper to replace a paper with another paper element, but forbids to change the value of the decision subelement. This policy is inconsistent since by replacing a paper element by another with a different decision subelement we are able to perform a forbidden update. In fact, the UAT replace(paper, paper) can simulate any other update type applying below a paper element. Thus, if the policy forbids replacement of paper nodes, then it would be inconsistent to allow any other operation on decision and title. Because of this problem, we argue that update types replace(B i , B i ) should not be used in policies. Instead, more specific privileges should be assigned individually, e.g., by allowing replacement of the text values of title or decision.
Inconsistencies can be classified into two forms: insertdelete and replace:
-Inconsistencies due to insert and delete operations arise when the policy allows one to insert and delete nodes of element type A while forbidding some operation in some descendant element type of the node. In addition, it is worth pointing out that insert-delete and replace inconsistencies are independent in a certain sense: that is, the presence or absence of an insert-delete inconsistency does not affect that of a replace inconsistency. This is due partly to the limits we place on the schema language, since each node in a valid document can only be updated by insert-delete operations or by replace operations, never both. This independence is important in the development of repair algorithms in the next section, since it means that we can repair the insert-delete inconsistencies and replace inconsistencies separately. We say that nothing is forbidden below A in a policy
Also, the set of forbidden edges of
A is E A = {(B i , B j ) | (A, replace(B i , B j )) ∈ F}. We say that a graph G = (V, E) is transitive if (x, y), (y, z) ∈ E then (x, z) ∈ E. We write G + A for the transitive closure of G A .
Definition 10
We say that a policy P = (A, F) defined over CEDTD D is syntactically consistent if and only if for every type A in D:
A, then nothing is forbidden below B, and
In the case of total policies, condition 2(a) above amounts to requiring that the replace graph G A is transitive (i.e.,
Our main result is that syntactic consistency is the same as consistency:
Theorem 1 A policy P = (A, F) defined over CEDTD D is consistent if and only if it is syntactically consistent.
Proof The reverse direction is proved in detail in Sect. 4.2. For the forward direction, we prove the contrapositive. Suppose P is not syntactically consistent. If property (1) is violated, then there is obviously an insert-delete inconsistency since we can simulate a forbidden UAT by deleting and inserting. If property (2a) is violated, then we can simulate a forbidden replace by performing a sequence of allowed replacements. Finally, if property (2b) is violated then we can simulate a forbidden UAT by performing a chain of replacements (similar to the case for property (1)). In each case, P is inconsistent.
Example 4 (Example 3 continued) The total policy P is inconsistent. Some of the inconsistencies that can be found are:
there is a forbidden replace (R, replace(B, K )) in F (condition 2(a), Definition 10), and -There are cycles in G R involving both B and J , but below each of them there is a forbidden UAT, namely (G, replace(H, I )) (condition 2(b), Definition 10).
It is easy to see that we can check whether a policy is syntactically consistent using standard polynomial-time graph algorithms to check properties (1), (2a), and (2b).
Proposition 1 The problem of deciding policy consistency with respect to CEDTDs is in ptime.
Proof By Theorem 1, there are two cases in which a policy can be inconsistent. The first case can be checked by traversing the graph following a topological sorting of the DTD graph. This can be done in time polynomial in the number of edges and vertices of the DTD graph. The second case consists of checking if the graphs G A are acyclic and transitive. Checking these two conditions for each element, A can be done in polynomial time.
Proof of Theorem 1
In this section, we present a detailed proof of Theorem 1. We first show the main result for SEDTDs and then show that the characterization can be lifted to CEDTDs. The proof for SEDTDs requires considering many combinations of cases. The main difficulty is in proving that syntactic consistency implies consistency, that is, there is no way to simulate a single forbidden operation via a sequence of allowed operations. The obvious approach by induction on the length of the allowed sequence does not work because subsequences of the allowed sequence do not necessarily continue to simulate the denied operation.
The solution is to establish the existence of an appropriate normal form for update sequences, such that (roughly speaking):
1. The normal form of an arbitrary update sequence op applied to input t is
consisting of a sequence of deletes, then replacements, then inserts. 2. The replacements r can be partitioned into chained subsequences r 1 , . . . , r j of the form
No deleted or replaced node (n i or m j ) is an ancestor of another of the modified nodes (n i , m j , l k ). 5. Allowed update sequences have allowed normal forms.
Pictorially, a normalized update sequence can be visualized as a tree with some of its nodes annotated with insertion operations insert(u), deletions delete, and replacement sequences replace(u 1 , . . . , u n ), such that no annotation occurs below a node with a delete or replace annotation.
Normalized update sequences are much easier to analyze than arbitrary allowed sequences in the proof of the reverse direction of Theorem 1.
We introduce some additional helpful notation: write
for the target node of an operation; write ≤ t for the ancestor-descendant ordering on t (that is, E * ); write ⊥ t for the relation {(n, m) ∈ N t × N t | n ≤ t m and m ≤ t n} (that is, n ⊥ t m means n and m are ≤ t -incomparable Proof Proof is by case analysis. For many cases, to ensure that the rewrites preserve validity and allowedness, we need the fact that updates only affect the types of nodes under the target node. This is easy to show for deterministic CEDTDs. Note that most of the identities only rearrange existing allowed updates and do not introduce any new update operations that we need to check against the policy. In a few cases, we need to do some work to check that the rewritten sequence is still allowed. In some cases, the rewrite rules cover cases that cannot happen in allowed sequences: for example, replace(n, u); delete(m) to delete(n) with m = r u cannot happen in an allowed sequence.
Proposition 2 Let P be a security policy and op an allowed update sequence mapping t to t . Then, there is an equivalent allowed update sequence op that is in normal form.
Proof We can use the identities to normalize an update sequence as follows. First, move occurrences of inserts to the end of the sequence. Next, move deletes to the beginning of the sequence. Finally, we use the remaining rules to eliminate dependencies among deletes, replacements and inserts, and to build chains of replacements. The resulting sequence is in normal form.
We say that two trees agree above n if the trees are equal after deleting the subtree rooted at n from each. Note that for all of the operations we consider, if op has target node n and op is valid on t then t agrees with Proof We show that for each node m unrelated to n, updates applying directly to m can be eliminated. If a deletion applies to m, then there must be an insertion replacing the deleted subtree exactly, and these are the only updates affecting m. Thus, it is safe to remove this useless deletion-insertion pair. If a replacement applies to m, then there must be subsequent replacements that restore the subtree at m. This sequence of replacements can be eliminated. No other possibilities are consistent with t and t being equal above n. Thus, by considering each node m in the tree that is unrelated to n, and removing the updates having an effect on m, we can obtain an equivalent update sequence op having only updates whose target node is related to n. This update sequence is still allowed since we have only removed allowed operations (and since all of the operations we have removed are independent of the remaining ones) and is still in normal form.
If t, t agree above n, and op is an allowed sequence, then we define the n-related normal form of op to be an equivalent allowed, normalized sequence of operations affecting the tree above or below n, which must exist by the above lemma. We can now show the result for SEDTDs:
Lemma 3 For SEDTD-based policies, syntactic consistency implies consistency.
Proof We prove the contrapositive. Suppose P is inconsistent, and let t be a tree, op a sequence allowed on t, and op denied on t by P, such that [ -op = insert(n, t). Consider the normal form of the op restricted to the updates related to n. Clearly op cannot consist only of updates at or below n since an insertion at n cannot be simulated by a deletion at n or by any operations that only apply below n. Also, no replacement can happen at n. If there is a deletion above n, there must also be an insertion above n that restores the extra deleted nodes and also has the effect of insert(n, t).
Hence there is a violation of rule 1. Otherwise, if there is a replacement above node n, then there must be one or more replacements restoring the rest of the tree to its previous form and inserting t, violating rule 2b (since the chain of replacements must be allowed by a cycle in some graph G A ).
-op = delete(n, t), replace(n, s). Similar to case for insert, since again these operations cannot be simulated solely by operations at or below n. -op = replace(n, t ). There are two possibilities. If the n-related normal form of op consists only of replacements at n, then the policy must violate rule 2. Otherwise, an argument similar to that in the above cases can be used to show that P must violate rule 1 or 3.
Lifting to CEDTDs
We now complete the proof of Theorem 1 by showing that there is a translation from CEDTDs to SEDTDs that associates each CEDTD policy with a unique SEDTD policy.
To translate CEDTDs to SEDTDs, let D be a CEDTD. We define SEDTD D • as follows. If A → str ∈ D, then we add
where each f is a factor of the form B 1 + · · · + B n or B * , then we translate to n + 1 rules 
where in the case for insert, we assume η(n) = A and A → f 1 , . . . , f n and f i = B * and t ∈ L(B), and node m i is the child of n in t • associated with A i . For the other updates, the translation is type-insensitive. Similarly, UATs can be translated as follows:
where in the case for insert and delete, we assume 
The key property of the translation is that it preserves consistency. To show this, we need a number of (routine) properties:
Lemma 4 Fix a CEDTD D and policy P. 
Theorem 1 now follows from Lemmas 3, 5 and 6.
Remark 1
We considered a number of alternative generalizations including full DTDs or EDTDs before settling on CEDTDs. It turns out to be quite difficult to analyze policies with respect to general DTDs because of the fact that individual updates typically insert, delete, or replace one node at a time, which can temporarily invalidate the document with respect to the DTD. In related work, Jacquemard and Rusinowitch show that consistency analysis for policies where the DTD can be temporarily violated is undecidable [15] . This suggests that there are likely to be subtle issues in increasing the expressiveness of tractable schema and policy languages.
Partial policies and completion
Partial policies may be smaller and easier to maintain than total policies, but are ambiguous because some permissions are left unspecified. Thus, there may be many ways to extend a partial policy to a consistent total one.
In this section, we consider the question of how to associate a consistent partial policy with a unique consistent total policy.
One (unsatisfactory) solution to this problem is to deny all of the operations that are not explicitly allowed by a partial policy. However, this can easily yield an inconsistent policy, because a UAT that is not mentioned by the policy could be simulated by its allowed UATs. Instead, we consider whether it is possible to find a total policy that only allows UATs that can already be simulated by the partial policy's allowed UATs. This approach does not add any privileges that the user did not already have according to the partial policy, in accordance with the principle of least privilege [27] .
Traditionally, the principle of least privilege states that users should be given access to the least resources needed for the application. If we view the explicit rules of a policy as the specification of application requirements, then our interpretation is compatible with the traditional view. There are many total policies that are consistent with a given partial policy, and to avoid giving a user more resources than necessary to fit the partial policy, we interpret a partial policy as the "smallest" (least-privilege) total extension.
However, it is not obvious that a partial policy (even if consistent) has any consistent total extension. We will now show that a consistent partial policy does have a consistent extension, and in particular it has a unique least-privilege consistent extension. These seem to be a natural choice for defining the meaning of a partial policy.
For convenience, we write A P and F P for the allowed and forbidden sets of a policy P; that is, P = (A P , F P ). We introduce an information ordering P Q, defined as A P ⊆ A Q and F P ⊆ F Q ; that is, Q extends P. We say that a partial policy P is semi-consistent if it has a consistent total extension. For example, a partial policy on the schema of Fig. 5 which allows (B, insert(E) ), (B, delete(E)), and denies (H, replaceVal) is not semi-consistent, because any extension of the policy must allow (H, replaceVal) to be consistent.
We also introduce a privilege ordering on total policies P ≤ Q, defined as A P ⊆ A Q ; that is, Q allows every operation that is allowed in P. This ordering has unique greatest lower bounds P ∧ Q defined as (A P ∩ A Q , F P ∪ F Q ). We now show that every semi-consistent policy has a leastprivilege consistent extension P † ; that is, P † is consistent and P † ≤ Q whenever Q is a consistent extension of P.
Lemma 7
If P 1 and P 2 extend P 0 then P 1 ∧ P 2 extends P 0 .
Proof Since both P 1 and P 2 extend P 0 , we have A P 1 , A P 2 ⊇ A P 0 and F P 1 , F P 2 ⊇ F P 0 ; hence
This completes the proof.
Lemma 8
If P 1 , P 2 are consistent total extensions of P 0 then P 1 ∧ P 2 is also a consistent extension of P 0 .
Proof By the previous lemma, P 1 ∧ P 2 extends P 0 . Suppose P 1 ∧ P 2 is inconsistent. Then, there exists an XML tree t, an atomic operation op 0 ∈ [[F P 1 ∧P 2 ]](t), and a sequence op allowed on t by
, so op 0 must be forbidden (with respect to some typing η) by either P 1 or P 2 . On the other hand, op must be allowed (with respect to some initial typing η) by both P 1 and P 2 , so t, op 0 , op forms a counterexample to the consistency of P 1 (or symmetrically P 2 ).
Proposition 3 Each semi-consistent partial policy P has a unique ≤-least consistent total extension P † .
Proof Since P is semi-consistent, the set S = {Q | P Q, Q total and consistent} is finite, nonempty, and closed under ∧, so has a ≤-least element P † = S.
In the rest of this section, we show how to find the leastprivilege consistent extension or determine that none exists (and hence that the partial policy is not semi-consistent). The basic idea is to define an explicit transformation T on policies that adds allowed UATs that can be simulated by other allowed UATs.
Define
the operator T : P(valid(D)) → P(valid(D)) as:
T is monotonic, so has a least fixed point T * on the finite lattice P (valid(D) ). The aim of the next sequence of lemmas is to show that if P is consistent then T * = P † , while if P is not semi-consistent then T * overlaps with F P . Thus, computing T * will give us a ptime algorithm for either computing P † or determining that P is not semi-consistent. We use the term completion for the process of computing the least-privilege complete total policy from a consistent policy.
Since T * calculates a fixed point, it is closed under applications of the rules (1)-(3) characterizing consistency. Hence, for any S, we obtain a consistent policy by allowing T * (S) and forbidding its complement. We define
Lemma 9 Let S be a set of privileges. Then T (S) = S if and only if (S, valid(D)\S) is consistent. Moreover, P * is a consistent policy over D. Proof For the first part, suppose T (S) = S. Then by inspection, S satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1 and so (S, valid(D)\S) is consistent. Conversely, if (S, valid(D)\S)
is consistent, then the conditions of Theorem 1 imply that T (S) = S. The second part is immediate.
Corollary 1
For any semi-consistent partial policy P, we have P † = P * .
Proof Assume P is semi-consistent and let S = A P . Let P † = (A † , F † ) be its least-privilege consistent extension. Since P * is consistent, total and P ≤ P * , it follows that P † ≤ P * , since P † is the least consistent total extension of P. Conversely, observe that
is the least fixed point of T * extending A † . This implies P * ≤ P † . To conclude, P * = P † since ≤ is anti-symmetric on total policies.
Next, we observe that the updates licensed by T * (S) can always be simulated by sequences of updates in S.
Lemma 10 If uat ∈ T * (S), then any operation op 0 matching uat on t can be simulated using a sequence of operations op that is valid and allowed on t by S (that is, such that [[op 0 ]](t) = [[op]](t)).
Proof First, assume uat ∈ T (S). We prove the consequence by cases according to the definition of T . If uat ∈ S, then there is nothing to do.
If for some A, B we have uat = (C, op) with B ≤ D C, with B * ∈ Rg D (A) and {(A, insert(B)), (A, delete(B))} ⊆ S, then let n = target (op 0 ), let m be the B-labeled node above m in t (there must be exactly one), and let t be the subtree of t rooted at m. We can simulate op 0 by deleting the B-labeled subtree to which op 0 applies, then inserting the tree resulting from applying op 0 ; thus, the sequence op = delete(m); insert(n, (m, t 1 ); replace(rt t 1 , t 2 ) ;
. . .
replace(rt t n−2 , t n−1 ); replace(rt t n −1 , [[op 0 ]](t ))
This update sequence is allowed on t and simulates op 0 . (C) and (B i , B j ) ∈ G + C (S) then let n = target (op 0 ) and let t be the subtree rooted at n. Let B i 1 , . . . , B i k be a sequence of nodes forming a path from B i = B i 1 to B j = B i k in G C , and choose t 1 , . . . , t k−1 satisfying t l ∈ I D (B i l ) . Then, the update sequence op = replace(n, t 1 ); replace(rt t 1 , t 2 ) ;
again is allowed and simulates op 0 . Now, if uat ∈ T * (S), then the conclusion follows by induction.
Finally, we show that we can determine semi-consistency and consistency using T * . Along the way, we show that the two notions are equivalent.
Theorem 2 Let P be a partial policy. The following are equivalent: (1) P is semi-consistent, (2) P is consistent, and
Proof To show (1) implies (2), if P is a consistent extension of P, then any inconsistency in P would be an inconsistency in P , so P must be consistent. To show (2) implies (3), we prove the contrapositive. If 
) implies (1), note that (T (A P ), valid(D) \ T (A P )) is consistent (by Lemma 9) and extends P (by Lemma 8) since
Since each step of T is computable in ptime and the number of elements of valid(D) is polynomial in the size of D, we can compute T * in polynomial time using least fixed point iteration. Hence, we can decide whether a partial policy is (semi-)consistent and if so find P † in ptime.
In fact, the T operator as defined above is idempotent, but this is not needed for the results above.
Policy repairs for SEDTDs
If a policy is inconsistent, we would like to suggest possible minimal ways of modifying it in order to restore consistency. In other words, we would like to find repairs that are as close as possible to the inconsistent policy.
There are several ways of defining these repairs. We might want to repair by changing the permissions of certain operations from allowed to forbidden and vice versa; or we might give preference to some type of changes over others. Also, we can measure the minimality of the repairs as a minimal number of changes or a minimal set of changes under set inclusion.
In this article, we will focus on finding repairs that transform UATs from allowed to forbidden and that minimize the number of changes. We believe that such repairs are a useful special case, since the repairs are guaranteed to be more restrictive than the original policy. F ) is a repair of a policy P = (A, F) defined over a CEDTD D if and only if:
Definition 11 A policy P = (A ,
1. P is a policy defined over D, 2. P is consistent, and 3. P ≤ P.
A repair is total if F = valid(D) \ A and partial otherwise. Furthermore a repair P = (A , F ) of P(A, F) is a minimal-total-repair if there is no total repair P = (A , F ) such that |A | < |A | and a minimal-partial-repair if F = F and there is no partial repair P = (A , F) such that |A | < |A |.
Given a policy P = (A, F) and k > 0, the total-repair (partial-repair) problem consists in determining if there exists a total-repair (partial-repair) P = (A , F ) of policy P such that |A\A | < k. This problem can be shown to be np-hard by reduction from the edge-deletion transitive-digraph problem [31] .
Theorem 3 The total-repair and partial-repair problems for policies over SEDTDs are np-complete.
Proof We will concentrate on the total-repair problem. The proof for the partial-repair problem is analogous.
First, we will prove that the total-repair is in np. We can determine if there is a repair P = (A , F ) of P such that |A\A | < k, by guessing a policy P , checking if |A\A | < k and if it is consistent. Since consistency and the distance can be checked in polynomial time, the algorithm is in np.
To prove that the problem is np-hard, we reduce from the edge-deletion transitive-digraph problem which is npcomplete [30, 31] . The problem consists in, given a directed graph G = (V, E) with V = {v 1 , . . . , v n } and E a set of edges without self-loops, determine whether there exists a set G = (V, E ) such that E ⊆ E, G is transitive and |E \ E | < k. Now, let us define a DTD D and a policy P. The production rules of D are:
It is easy to see that G A = G and therefore finding a repair will consist of finding the minimal number of edges to delete from G to make the graph transitive.
If the SEDTD has no disjunction in its production rules, then the only type of inconsistencies arise when an operation is denied below an element type that is allowed to be inserted and deleted (case 1 of Definition 10). In this case, the distance between the policy and its minimal repair will be equal to the number of such inconsistencies. Thus, the total-repair problem in this case is in ptime.
Computing minimal repairs
For a policy P defined over a schema D, we will construct a disjunctive logic program with weak negation such that there is a one-to-one correspondence between each model of it and the repairs of P. Satisfying models with minimal violations of weak constraints can be found by answer-set programming solvers such as DLV [19] , and we will use DLV syntax. Upper and lower case letters denote variables and constants, respectively. The program uses predicates: (i) U AT to store the valid UATs; (ii) a and d to store the allowed and denied UATs, respectively; (iii) desc to store the subelement relation between element types; (iv) rA and rD to contain the allowed and forbidden UATs in the repair. Op, E 1 , E 2 ) ← rA(X, ins, Y, null), rA(X, del, Y, null) ,
rA(Z ,
Rules (1) and (2) are used to construct all possible policies obtained from policy P by keeping all denied operations as denied but letting allowed operations to be changed to either allowed or denied. This implements our choice of looking for repairs that are more restrictive than the policy that we are trying to repair. Rules (3), (4), and (5) make sure that the repairs have no inconsistencies. Indeed, rule (3) ensures that if it is possible to insert and delete a certain element type, then all the operations below it should be allowed; rule (4) forces the replace graphs to be transitive; rule (5) checks that if an element type belongs to a cycle, then everything is allowed below it. The denial constraint (6) makes sure that no operation is both allowed and denied in the repair. Rule (7) computes a total policy if P was partial. Finally, rule (8) corresponds to a weak constraint that ensures that the number of permissions that are modified is minimized. A weak constraint is of the form ⇐ ϕ, where ϕ is a conjunction of atoms. The weak constraint is violated every time an assignment makes ϕ true in a model. The models of a program with weak constraints correspond to the answer sets that minimize the violations of the weak constraints. Note that only f (D, P) depends on the schema and the policy, since the rules in r are independent.
Given a schema D and a policy P, the repair P M = (A M , F M ) associated with an optimal answer-set model M of (F, P) is obtained from the rA and rD predicates. This is, A M and F M contain all the UATs in rA and rD, respectively. Every policy P M obtained from an optimal answer-set M of (D, P) is a minimal repair of policy P. Furthermore, for every minimal repair P of policy P there exists an optimal answer-set M of (D, P) such that P M = P .
Example 5 (Example 4 continued) Program f (D, P) contains the following facts:
UAT (r, rep, a, b) .
a(c, del, f, null). desc(a, r ). UAT (r, rep, b, k). a(h, repV, null, null) desc(c, r ). UAT (c, del, f, null). . . . desc(c, a). . . . d(r, rep, b, k). desc( f, a). a(r, rep, a, b). d(g, rep, h, i). . . . a(r, rep, b, j)
.
. . a(c, ins, a, null). desc(a, a).
Program (D, P) has 16 optimal answer-set models that have a 1-1 correspondence with the minimal repairs which are obtained by the combination of denying: (G)) or (E, delete(G) ), and 4. { (R, replace(A, B) ), (R, replace(J, K ))} or {(R, replace(B, J )), (R, replace(J, K ))}.
The first three resolve inconsistencies that correspond to violations of condition (1) of Definition 10. The fourth corresponds to violations of condition (2a).
Finally, note that a simple variation of the above approach can be used to test whether a (partial) policy is consistent, simply by replacing the rules r with the following c :
This is a stratified Datalog program that has a solution containing a tuple i(X, Op, E 1 , E 2 ) for every inconsistent UAT.
Approximate algorithms for minimal repairs
In this section, we discuss a polynomial repair algorithm that finds a repair of a total or partial policy which is not necessarily minimal but tries to minimize the number of changes.
The algorithm to compute a minimal repair of a policy relies on the independence property mentioned earlier, between insert-delete (Definition 10, condition (1)) inconsistencies and replace (Definition 10, conditions (2a) and (2b)) operations. As a result, a local repair of an inconsistency w.r.t. insert-delete operations will never solve nor create an inconsistency with respect to a replace operation and vice versa. We will separately describe the algorithm for repairing the insert-delete inconsistencies and then the algorithm for the replace ones.
Both algorithms make use of the marked DTD graph MG D = (G D , μ, χ) μ is a function from nodes in V D to {"+", "−"} and χ is a function from V D to {−1, ⊥}. In a marked graph for a DTD D and a policy P = (A, F) , each node in the graph is either marked with "+" (i.e., nothing is forbidden below the node) or with a "−" (i.e., there exists at least one update access type that is forbidden below the node). If, for nodes A and B in the DTD, both (A, insert(B)) and (A, delete(B)) are in A and μ(A) = "−", then χ(A) = "⊥". A marked graph is obtained from algorithm markGraph which takes as input a DTD graph and a policy P and traverses the DTD graph starting from the nodes with out degree 0 and marks the nodes and edges as discussed above.
Algorithm 1 markGraph
Example 6 Consider the graph for DTD D in Fig. 10a and policy P = (A, F), with A defined in Example 3. The result of applying markGraph to this DTD and policy is shown in Fig. 10b . Notice that nodes B, E and J are marked with both a "−" and "⊥" since (i) update access type (G, replace(H, I )) is in F and (ii) all insert and delete update access types for B, E, and J are in A. For readability purposes, we do not show the multiplicities in the marked DTD graph.
Repairing inconsistencies for insert and delete operations
Recall that if both the insert and delete operations are allowed at some element type and there is some operation below this type that is not allowed, then there is an inconsistency (see Definition 10, condition 1). The marked DTD graph provides exactly this information: a node A is labeled with "⊥" if it is inconsistent w.r.t. insert/delete operations. For each such node and for the repair strategy that we have chosen, the inconsistency can be minimally repaired by removing 
Algorithm 3 InsDelRepair
Input: DTD graph G D , security policy P Output: Set of UATs to remove from P to restore consistency in P w.r.t. insert-delete inconsistencies 1:
Randomly choose either (A, insert(B)) or (A, delete(B)) and assign it to U 6:
changes ← changes ∪ U 7: return changes either (A, insert(B)) or (A, delete(B)) from A. Algorithm InsDelRepair takes as input a DTD graph G D and a security policy P = (A, F) and returns a set of UATs to remove from A to restore consistency w.r.t. insert-delete inconsistencies.
Example 7
Given the marked DTD graph in Fig. 10b , it is easy to see that the UATs that must be repaired are associated with nodes B, J , and E (all nodes are marked with "⊥"). The repairs that can be proposed to the user are to remove from A one UAT from each of the following sets:
Repairing inconsistencies for replace operations
There are two types of inconsistencies related to replace operations (see Definition 10, conditions (2a)-(2b)): the first arises when some element A is contained in some cycle and something is forbidden below it; the second arises when the replace graph G A cannot be extended to a transitive graph without adding a forbidden edge in F. In what follows we will refer to these types of inconsistencies as negative-cycle and forbidden-transitivity. By Theorem 3, the repair problem is np-complete, and therefore, unless p = np, there is no polynomial-time algorithm to compute a minimal repair to 
/* If there is an edge missing for transitive or if there is a cycle over a node with a UAT forbidden below */ 10:
Let e be one of (A, B), (B, C) (chosen randomly) 12:
for all F ∈ V R s.t. F is reachable from the start vertex of e in G R do 14:
return Sol the replace inconsistencies. Our objective then is to find an algorithm that runs in polynomial time and computes a repair that is not necessarily minimal.
Algorithm ReplaceNaive traverses the marked graph MG D and at each node, checks whether its production rule is of the form A → B 1 + · · · + B n . If this is the case, it builds the replace graph G A for A and runs a modified version of the Floyd-Warshall algorithm [12] C) and (C, B) and μ(C) = "−", i.e., there is a negative-cycle, one of the two edges is deleted. Algorithm ReplaceNaive returns the set of edges to delete from each node to remove replace inconsistencies.
Example 8
The replace graph G G has no negative cycles nor forbidden-transitivity, therefore it is not involved in any inconsistency. On the other hand, the replace graph Fig. 11a , is the source of many inconsistencies. A possible execution of ReplaceNaive (shown in Fig. 12) is: (A, B) , Fig. 10b , therefore there is a negative-cycle and either (K , J ) or (J, K ) has to be deleted. If (K , J ) is deleted, the resulting graph has no forbidden-transitive and nor negative cycles. The policy obtained by removing (R, replace(A, B) ), (R, replace(B, J )), and (R, replace(J, K )) from A has no replace inconsistencies.
The ReplaceNaive algorithm might remove more than the necessary edges to achieve consistency: in our example, if we had removed edge (B, J ) at the first step, then we would have resolved the inconsistencies that involve edges (A, B) , (B, J ), and (J, K ). ReplaceSetCover is an alternative to ReplaceNaive that can find a solution closer to a minimal repair. This algorithm also uses a modified version of the Floyd-Warshall algorithm. In this case, the modification consists in computing the transitive closure of the replace graph G A and labeling each newly constructed edge e with a set of justifications J . Each justification contains sets of edges of G A that were used to add e in G + A . Also, if a node is found to be part of a negative-cycle, it is labeled with the justifications J of the edges in each cycle that contains the node. An edge or vertex might be justified by more than one set of edges. In fact, the number of justifications an edge or node might have is O(2 |E| ). To avoid the exponential number of justifications, ReplaceSetCover assigns at most J justifications to each edge or node, where J > 0 is a given parameter. This new labeled graph is then used to construct an instance of the minimum set cover problem (MSCP) [25] . The solution to the MSCP can be used to determine the set of edges to remove from G A so that none of the justifications that create inconsistencies are valid anymore. Because of the upper bound J on the number of justifications, it might be the case that the graph still has forbidden-transitive or negative cycles. Thus, the justifications have to be recomputed and the set cover run again until there are no more replace inconsistencies.
Justifications for edges represent violations of transitivity. Justification for nodes represent negative cycles. If we want to remove the inconsistencies, it is enough to delete one edge from each set in J .
The previous example shows that, for each node A, replace inconsistencies can be repaired by removing at least one edge from each of the justifications of edges and vertices in G + A . It is easy to see that this problem can be reduced to the MSCP. An instance of the MSCP consists of a universe U and a set S of subsets of U. A subset C of S is a set cover if the union of the elements in it is U. A solution of the MSCP is a set cover with the minimum number of elements.
The set cover instance associated with G
where:
and 2. S = {I(e) | e ∈ E} where I(e) = {s | s ∈ U, e ∈ s}.
Intuitively, U contains all the inconsistencies, and the set I(e) the replace inconsistencies in which an edge e is involved. In this instance of the MSCP, the U is a set of justifications, therefore S is a set of sets of justifications.
Example 10
The minimum set cover instance for the ongoing example MSCP(G
The extensions of I are given in Table 3 , where each column corresponds to a set I and each row to an element in U. I(J, K ) . Now, using the solution from the set cover, we remove edges (B, J ) and (J, K ) from G R . If we try to compute the justifications once again, it turns out that there are no more negative cycles and that the graph is transitive. Therefore, by removing (R, replace(B, J )) and (R, replace(J, K )) from A, there are no replace inconsistencies in node R.
The set cover problem is MAXSNP-hard [25] , but its solution can be approximated in polynomial time using a A, B) ) 
if (B, C) ∈ E and B = C then 14:
for all j 1 ∈ J ((B, A)) and 
greedy algorithm that can achieve an approximation factor of log(n) where n is the size of U [8] . In our case, n is O(J × |Ele|). In the ongoing example, the approximation algorithm of the set cover will return a cover of size 2. This is better than what was obtained by the ReplaceNaive algorithm.
Algorithm ReplaceRepair will compute the set of UATs to remove from A, by using either ReplaceNaive (if J = 0) or ReplaceSetCover (if J > 0).
Computation of a repair
Algorithm Repair computes a new consistent policy P = (A , F ) from P = (A, F) by removing from A the
Algorithm 7 ReplaceRepair
Input: DTD graph G D , security policy P = (A, F ) , Maximum Number of Justifications J Output: Set of UATs to remove from A to restore consistency in P w.r.t. replace inconsistencies 1:
Algorithm 8 Repair
Input: DTD graph G D , security policy P = (A, F ), boolean total, maximum number of justifications J Output: A repair P of P. The repair is total if parameter total= 1, partial otherwise.
union of the UATs returned by algorithms InsDelRepair and ReplaceRepair. If argument total of algorithm Repair is true, then the repair returned by it will be total. If false, then a partial policy such that F = F will be returned.
Theorem 4 Given a total (partial) policy P, the Repair algorithm returns a total (partial) repair of P.
Proof Given an inconsistent policy P = (A, F), let us assume, to obtain a contradiction, that the policy P = (A , F ) returned by algorithm Repair is not a repair. Since P is defined over D, and by construction P ≤ P, this implies that P is not consistent. Then, it should be the case that either: Therefore, P is consistent and is a repair of P.
Implementation and experimental evaluation
We implemented the consistency checking and repair algorithms, for partial and total policies, in a system called ACCon, short for Access Control CONsistency. In ACCon the user can load a DTD or XML Schema (which is internally converted to a CEDTD), and an associated write-access control policy (also expressed in XML). The implementation includes a user interface that displays the inconsistencies and proposes changes to the policy using InsDelRepair, RepairNaive, and RepairSetCover. The user is then able to select among the suggested changes, and ACCon will apply the changes to the policy and check whether consistency is achieved. If the policy is not consistent, the process is repeated until no more inconsistencies are found.
Experimental setup
We evaluated the completion, consistency and repair algorithms described earlier in the article in comparison with a generic approach based on DLV. Specifically, we used DLV to check the consistency of policies and to calculate exact minimal repairs, when possible. Our benchmark includes both real and randomly generated synthetic schemas. The real schemas are based on existing schemas for IUPHAR-DB [14] , SBML, XMark [28] , and Sigmod Record and DBLP bibliography data. IUPHAR-DB is a database of pharmacological receptors maintained by colleagues at the University of Edinburgh; our schema is derived from an XML export format for their data. The SBML (Systems Biology Markup Language) schema is based on SBML level 1, version 2, obtained from the SBML.org website. 1 The Sigmod Record and DBLP schemas are based on the standard schemas for these sources, obtained from the UW XML dataset collection. 2 To generate the synthetic DTDs, we used the DTD Generator, 3 a configurable Java program that takes into account a number of different parameters for the production of DTDs such as (a) the maximum depth of the DTD, (b) the number of distinct labels in the DTD, (c) the expected number of children per node (selected randomly by a Poisson distribution), and (d) the probability of '*' per node. The DTDs obtained from the generator were recursive, so we manually translated them into nonrecursive ones. Schema nodes were annotated with '*' with probability 0.05. We produced DTDs with 10, 30, 50, 70, 100, 200, and 500 elements. For the DTDs with less than 100 elements, we fixed the DTD depth to 4, the number of children of a node to 3, whereas for the DTDs with more than 100 elements, we fixed the number of children to 6 and the number of distinct children per node to 10. We write RANDOM-10, …, RANDOM-500 for these schemas, where RANDOM-n refers to the random schema with n elements.
For both real and synthetic schemas, we report on policies generated randomly. A random policy is generated by allowing each possible UAT with probability p. For most experiments, we considered policies generated with p = 0.5; we also considered the effect of varying this probability on repair size. For most measurements, we used justification limit J = 10. We also considered the effect of varying J.
All experiments were carried out on a MacBook Pro with 2.8 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo CPU with 4GB RAM. We used a library called DLVWrapper to interface with the DLV executable (both are available from DLVSystem S.R.L.).
Experimental results
Completion, consistency, and repair time
The experimental results for partial policy completion, consistency checking, and repair time are summarized in Fig. 13 . We first show the completion time and consistency checking times for our algorithms, then the DLV consistency checking time, then the times for repairing based on ReplaceNaive, ReplaceSetCover and using DLV. The time for insert-delete repairs is added to both the naive and MSCP-based repair times, to ensure a fair comparison with DLV, which solves both repair problems at once. However, the time for insertdelete repairs was negligible compared to that needed for either naive or MSCP repairs (usually, it was less than a millisecond). DLV timed out when we attempted to use it to repair random policies of 100 elements or more. The times reported for DLV include overhead for calling DLV as an external process from our Java implementation, as well as time to construct the DLV program from the schema and policy. The randomly generated IUPHAR policies were all consistent, so we do not report any repair times for them (in any case, these policies can never have any replace inconsistencies and, as noted above, insert-delete repair is fast).
Our implementations of both the policy completion and consistency algorithms are faster than the generic approach used by DLV by approximately an order of magnitude. Our naive repair algorithm is also always faster than the MSCPbased algorithm, sometimes by more than an order of magnitude. Likewise, MSCP-based repair is always faster than DLV, often by over an order of magnitude.
Repair size
We measured the sizes of insert-delete, naive replace, and MSCP-based replace repairs found by the respective algorithms. (By size, we mean the number of changes done to a policy to repair it.) We also measured the sizes of minimal repairs found by DLV, subject to a timeout of 60 seconds. The results are summarized in Fig. 14 . Both figures report the number of replace repairs found by DLV, since the number of insert-delete repairs found by either DLV or our algorithms is the same. Repair sizes are omitted for DLV on larger random policies where DLV timed out.
For real schemas, the number of repairs needed for a random policy was typically small: on average, less than three insert-delete repairs and less than two replace repairs. For all of the real schemas, the MSCP-based algorithm found a minimal repair, as of course DLV did. The naive repair was often significantly larger.
For random schemas, the number of insert-delete repairs was typically small, even for larger policies: on average there were under 10 insert-delete repairs. However, the number of replace repairs tends to grow as the size of the policy increases. Again, the naive repair is often significantly larger than the minimal repair found by DLV (when possible), and usually significantly larger than the MSCP-based repair. The MSCP-based repair is often not minimal but usually close to the minimal one found by DLV.
Varying justification limit
Recall that the ReplaceSetCover algorithm has a parameter J limiting the number of justifications to consider per edge. The above experiments used a justification limit J = 10. To evaluate the sensitivity of the algorithm to this justification limit, we measured the repair times and policy sizes for 52 trials involving random policies for J ∈ {5, 10, 20, 50}. We obtained these trials by discarding those policies reported above that had no replace inconsistencies. Fig. 15 shows the repair times and repair sizes for the different justification limits. These are sorted by the time or size for the largest justification limit J = 100; thus, large deviations from the performance for J = 100 are readily visible. Both plots use a logarithmic scale, so only large variations are visible.
These results suggest that increasing J only has an effect for large policies, and this effect is to increase running time significantly, while decreasing repair size modestly. Thus, a choice of J = 10 or smaller is reasonable.
Varying allow probability
Our final experimental results concern the relationship between the probability p used to generate random policies and the degree of inconsistency of a policy. The relationship between p and the minimal repair size is hard to predict, since a policy must include both allowed and forbidden UATs in order to be inconsistent. We experimentally evaluated the repair sizes found by naive, MSCP, and DLV-based repair algorithms. The results are summarized in Fig. 16 .
We observe a peak in the number of inconsistencies for p = 0.75. For RANDOM-50, we can calculate the minimal repair exactly using DLV and it follows this pattern. For RANDOM-500, DLV times out, but the same pattern holds for the approximate algorithms. Interestingly, both sets of results also show that for policies with few forbidden UATs ( p = 0.99), the naive repair is often smaller than the MSCPbased repair. This suggests that for policies with few forbidden UATs, the naive algorithm may be better.
Discussion
Our experiments show that consistency checking, partial policy completion, and policy repair can be implemented efficiently, compared to a generic implementation using an external solver such as DLV. Our algorithms often return minimal repairs for small examples, while providing answers much faster than the generic DLV solver on larger examples. Our algorithms also run fast enough to be useful in an interactive policy editor for realistic schemas and policies.
Our experiments varying J show that a small value of J is reasonable since increasing the justification limit slows down repair for larger policies while not finding significantly smaller repairs. Our experiments varying p show that repair size peaks near p = 0.75 and suggest that the naive repair strategy is preferable for policies in which most operations are already allowed, since it is much faster and produces a smaller repair for p = 0.99.
For many applications, the relative ease of implementation using DLV (or any other Datalog implementation) would be a substantial advantage, but to repair larger policies, our algorithms offer superior performance.
Related work
De Capitani di Vimercati et al. [10] give an overview of access control techniques for XML, focusing on enforcement mechanisms. Fundulaki and Maneth [13] first considered consistency of XML write-access control policies, and they showed the problem is undecidable for policies defined using XPath path expressions in the absence of a schema. They introduced the schema-based policy model XAcU annot that we have extended in this article. Cautis, Abiteboul and Milo in [7] discuss XML update constraints to restrict insert and delete updates, and propose to detect updates that violate these constraints by measuring the size of the modification of the database. This approach differs from our security framework for two reasons: (a) we consider in addition to insert and delete also replace operations and (b) we require that each operation in the sequence of updates does not violate the security constraints, whereas in their case, they require that only the input and output database satisfies them.
Minimal repairs are used in the problem of returning consistent answers from inconsistent databases [1] . There, a consistent answer is defined in terms of all the minimal repairs of a database. In [2] , the set cover problem was used to find repairs of databases w.r.t. denial constraints.
Moore [23] studies the problem of whether an XML document can be generated by a sequence of operations allowed by an access control policy. He shows that this problem is undecidable in general and identifies some decidable special cases (such as monotonically increasing updates).
Jacquemard and Rusinowitch [15] model XML updates using rewriting rules and apply techniques from tree automata to prove decidability and (mostly) undecidability results for policy consistency in the absence of a schema. They give a PTIME algorithm for consistency with respect to a schema, similar to Theorem 1, but do not investigate partial policies or the repair problem. They also show that consistency is undecidable if the allowed sequence can temporarily violate the schema. They do not consider the repair problem, which is likely more difficult in the absence of a schema that constrains the search space of policy changes.
Boneva et al. [4] study the problem of safely propagating updates to XML security views back to uniform, side-effect free updates to the original source document. This technique is complementary to our approach. Their technique assumes that the user is allowed to update any data in the view, but may constrain the updates that can be performed on the source. Our update access control policies can be used to make some parts of the view read-only, and our algorithms can then check that the view policy is consistent. It may be interesting to study the problem of translating policies expressed on the view to policies on the underlying source data (or vice versa) or checking that allowed view updates translate to allowed source updates.
Conclusion
Access control policies attempt to constrain the actual operations users can perform, but are usually enforced in terms of syntactic representations of the operations. Thus, policies controlling update access to XML data may forbid certain operations but permit other operations that have the same effect. In this article, we have studied such inconsistency vulnerabilities and shown how to check consistency and repair inconsistent policies. We also considered consistency and repair problems for partial policies that are more convenient to write since many privileges may be left unspecified. We showed that the repair problem is intractable, but developed approximate algorithms and showed that they yield reasonable results in practice. Finally, we evaluated the algorithms and showed that the consistency and insert-delete repair algorithms are fast in practice, while the approximate replace repair algorithms are more computationally intensive but still much faster than finding exact solutions using a state-of-theart answer-set programming solver.
There are a number of possible directions for future work, including studying consistency for more general security policies specified using XPath expressions or constraints, investigating the complexity of and algorithms for other classes of repairs, and developing consistent policy languages based on larger classes of DTDs or schemas.
